"Unfortunately, right now what we've seen not just in Israel, but within the Palestinian territories, among the Arab states, world-wide, is a profound cynicism about the possibility of any progress whatsoever being made towards peace" said US President Obama when meeting King Abdullah of Jordan -- the first Middle East leader to visit the White House under its new management. (Previous US Presidents had often granted this honour to the Prime Minister of Israel.)
If anyone could break through the stalemate, it should be Barack Hussein Obama -- to arouse hope where there was despair, to set high goals and prove that "Yes, we can!" For a turn in US policy the Netanyahu-Lieberman crew in Israel may provide the right anvil. Still, it's no mean task.
In the past nine years, "The Peace Process" -- and also "Peace" itself -- have become virtually dirty words. With the air of stating a self-evident fact, commentators nowadays habitually reiterate that "of course, peace with the Palestinians cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future."
Israelis take for granted that their government had made "generous offers", to which Palestinian "responded by suicide bombings and the lobbing of missiles." As Palestinians see it, on the West Bank Israel never gave them more than a few miserable enclaves, soon engulfed and bloodily re-occupied -- while direct Israeli rule in Gaza was merely replaced by a suffocating siege and murderous bombings.
The bottom line, as defined both by Israelis and by Palestinians, sounds remarkably similar: "We tried to make peace with them, but they don't want it -- they just want to kill us and take all the land." The two sides differ only on who is "Us" and who are "Them." All too often, this translates into a self-righteous ruthlessness and a total refusal to make any apology for killing and maiming -- since "they" brought it upon themselves.
The 1993 Rabin-Arafat handshake, which evoked an outburst of hope, has long since been wiped from collective memory. Israeli toddlers, too young to comprehend the TV images from Washington which made their elders excited, have by now grown to become the soldiers who subjected Gaza to weeks of ongoing shooting, bombing and destruction from the air, sea and land.
In Gaza, Israel's generals had undertaken a policy of "no risk" -- i.e. the shooting and destroying of any "target" upon the most light suspicion that it might harbour a threat to their soldiers. In all too many cases, such targets proved to be civilian homes whose inhabitants -- children and all -- were blown to bits or burned to a cinder.
By the final tally of the "body count", the No Risk Policy translated into "better a hundred dead Palestinians than a single Israeli soldier." The general Israeli public -- caring a great deal for its own sons and very little, if at all, for the lives of Palestinians -- accepted this as fair and justified. Even the belated testimonies of some horror-stricken soldiers failed to break through the wall of self-righteousness, being soon dismissed as "malicious rumours" and "fabrications" by the army's own investigation of its own acts.
Much of international public opinion was shocked and revolted by the Gaza carnage. But the government of Israel could -- and did -- rely upon having the solid backing of the President of the United States. Having staged the utterly unconvincing photo opportunity of Annapolis with its concomitant hollow promise of "a Palestinian state by the end of 2008", George W. Bush did not lift a finger to prevent the carnage with which 2008 actually ended and the new year started.
The Gaza War had, however, a very clear and rigid time limit, determined by the day of Obama's inauguration. Great was the haste to make sure that every last Israeli soldier be evacuated from the Gaza Strip before the new boss entered the Oval Office. Not the slightest risk could be taken that the unpredictable new President's very first act would be to order the removal of any remaining soldiers from Gaza.
A jury-rigged coalition
Officially, Israeli Prime Ministers derive their authority from a popular mandate in elections and a parliamentary majority in the Knesset. But though stated in no written law, a new Israeli PM cannot really feel secure at the seat of power until having set out for the White House and gotten the approval of the President of the United States -- much like feudal vassals whose tenure needed to be confirmed by their overlord.
An Israeli politician might garner popularity by displaying bellicosity towards Arabs, and on occasion also towards Europeans, Russians and/or other nations. But a PM getting in trouble with Washington is liable to face considerable problems also on the Israeli home front -- as, for example, Yitzchak Shamir discovered to his cost when tangling with the elder George Bush in 1991. Given Israel's almost total dependence upon American military, economic and diplomatic support, Israelis expect their PM to give high priority to maintenance of this lifeline.
It seems that never before was a first meeting between an Israeli PM and a US President predicted, anticipated, discussed, analysed and debated so long in advance as the one due to take place as we go into print.
Speculations and calculations already started last November -- immediately when it became clear that Americans have given Obama their mandate while polls in Israel indicated the great likelihood of a Netanyahu victory. Which meant, in essence, that US politics were shifting to the left while Israeli ones were going to the right, and that the two new leaders were likely to have incompatible views and plans on issues of vital importance.
In the run-up to the elections in February this year, Kadima Party Leader Tzipi Livni asserted that, as PM, she would get along with Obama much better than Netanyahu could. After all, unlike the Likud leader Livni is a staunch supporter (at least verbally) of a peace based on the creation of an independent Palestinian State at Israel's side.
As Foreign Minster she did conduct long and arduous negotiations on this very issue with Palestinian negotiator Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala). On the other hand, these talks bore no concrete result, and were eventually broken off due to the Israeli assault on Gaza -- which Livni strongly supported, on the argument that "The terrorist Palestinians must be defeated so that peace could be made with the moderates" (it's hardly possible to imagine that she believed this herself).
Livni did, in fact, convince many voters that she was the best candidate. Especially, she drew away a substantial part of the Labour Party's traditional voters, who felt little confidence in their party's current leader, Defence Minister Ehud Barak (who would soon prove just how justified such suspicions were).
Also the Meretz Party was terribly decimated, paying heavily for its inconsistent stance during the Gaza War. Having supported the war on the first day, and shifted to opposing it a few days later, Meretz lost war-supporting voters to Livni's Kadima and staunch anti-war voters to the Hadash Communists. Altogether Meretz came perilously close to being completely wiped out.
But though Livni's Kadima gained more voters than Netanyahu's Likud, this was not enough to catapult her to power. In Israel's multi-party, proportional electoral system, no party had ever gained an absolute majority of parliamentary seats, and all Israeli governments had always been coalition governments.
The odious Avigdor Lieberman -- Netanyahu's former protŽgŽ, now well embarked on establishing a power base on his own -- did all too well in an elections campaign which combined appeals to the communal allegiance of Russian Israelis with anti-Arab incitement which unfortunately found support among a wider audience.
The combined parliamentary forces of Netanyahu and Lieberman -- added to a host of smaller nationalist, religious and nationalist-religious formations -- constituted a majority. Though Kadima was the single biggest party, the elections result ensured that it would be Netanyahu who formed the next government. But the elections also determined that Netanyahu would not bestride the political scene as a colossus, but be reduced to putting together a shaky jury-rigged cabinet.
Netanyahu had to bow to the intransigent demand of the indispensable Lieberman and entrust to him the Foreign Affairs portfolio -- placing an outspoken racist, priding himself on his trademark bluntness, in a position which by all tradition and logic should have gone to a subtle and nuanced diplomat.
This was followed by quite a lot of ministerial appointments which had no other logic than to appease and satisfy one coalition partner or another. But, as Nahum Barnea pointed out in Yediot Aharonot, it was not enough for Netanyahu to please the Israeli partners in his ruling coalition -- he was also faced with Barack Obama as an invisible party at the cabinet table.
Looking for a fig leaf
Had Binyamin Netanyahu been content to form a coalition solely with those whom he publicly termed "My Natural Partners", he could have had a ready-made cabinet within days -- an ideologically cohesive nationalist cabinet, enjoying a parliamentary majority. But in that case, as anonymous "senior Netanyahu aides" confided to the press, he would have "found it useless even to pack his things for the flight to Washington."
Thus, Netanyahu embarked on a courting campaign simultaneously targeting both Barak and Livni, his elections rivals. Impassioned public appeals were made to "their feeling of national responsibility" and "the need to forge National Unity in face of a dangerous crisis." (These solemn phrases were deconstructed by commentators into Netanyahu's reluctance to face Obama without at least one established "dove" at his side.) Also, Israel's President Shimon Peres -- having little actual power, but quite some prestige -- enthusiastically threw himself into co-promoting this "Quest for National Unity."
Livni proved impervious. Buoyed by her unexpectedly strong electoral showing, she would enter into partnership with Netanyahu only as "a full and equal partner" -- i.e., with the position of Prime Minister being "rotated" and exchanged between herself and Netanyahu on an "equal time" basis. She also asked for Netanyahu to formally commit himself to the Two State Solution, already accepted by the entire International Community as the indispensable format. Otherwise, her presence in the government would be "little more than a fig-leaf", a role Livni was determined not to play.
Grumblingly Netanyahu determined "not to pay Livni's exorbitant price" and watch her lead the Kadima Party into opposition (to the unconcealed regret of the more opportunist part of her fellow Kadima members).
The PM-to-be then turned to the battered Labour Party. Ehud Barak, who had just led his party to the worst electoral defeat in its history, had hardly any political or ideological demands. His main and only aspiration was to continue being the Minister of Defence, a demand which Netanyahu was quite ready, and indeed eager, to grant.
In fact, throughout the elections campaign the papers had continually published rumours and speculations about a secret Netanyahu-Barak "understanding", to exactly that effect. Barak's vehement denials at that time were duly published, which by now he may not like to be reminded of.
Initially, Barak's fellow Labourites rejected the idea of joining Netanyahu, considering it as no less than "suicide for the Labour Party" and the driving away of the party's last remaining voters. Which meant that for some weeks, Netanyahu was confronted with the imminent possibility of having to face Obama with no fig leaf whatsoever to hide behind. However, he was saved by Ofer Eini, boss of the Histadrut Trade Union Federation, who for considerations of his own came down in favour of Labour joining the government.
The block of votes controlled by the unions at the Labour Conference, where the decision was taken, was enough to turn the tide and get the party into the new government. The Labour Party did, however, remain deeply divided and plagued by a factional fight, with nearly half of its parliamentary representation in permanent rebellion against the party leadership and poised to break away altogether.
Still, Netanyahu had more or less what he wanted -- though the top-heavy cabinet he finally presented to the Knesset, after exhausting weeks of negotiations and wheeling-dealing, failed to evince any great enthusiasm even from those who had voted for its constituent parties.
Diplomatic ping-pong
Neither Netanyahu nor Obama seemed in a big hurry to have their first face-to-face meeting.
The new PM was invited to address the annual conference of AIPAC, the powerful Israeli lobby. He inquired whether, being in Washington anyway, he might on the same occasion also casually drop in at the White House -- as previous Prime Ministers had done on past occasions. However, the politely worded answer from Obama's staff expressed regret that the new President would not be free at that time. (It later turned out the President's timetable did have a vacancy into which a meeting with Shimon Peres could after all be fitted.)
Finally, the date of May 18 was fixed upon -- a month and half after Netanyahu's assumption of power. Repeatedly asked what he was going to say, Netanyahu again and again reiterated that his team was in the process of preparing "a creative and positive plan" which would be unearthed when time became ripe. Commentators interpreted this as "A desperate search for creative ways of plausibly dressing up and packaging a 'No', so as to make it look like a 'Yes, but'."
In fact, some of Netanyahu's ploys were floated through the media long ahead of his physical arrival in the US capital -- with a good part of them shot down immediately in sorties from America.
For example, Netanyahu came up with the idea of "Economic Peace" -- i.e., Israel would make some investment in building industrial zones and creating jobs for West Bank Palestinians (incidentally also helping Israeli employers in need of cheap labour). In return, all discussion of evacuating its army and settlers would be put indefinitely off.
Obama's designated emissary, Senator John Mitchell of North Ireland mediation fame, came around to the region, "to listen, rather than to speak." He didcomment, however, that "economic peace is necessary and useful, but cannot be disconnected from the political and military aspects, as a roof cannot be put on without first building the walls." Subsequently, much less in this vein was heard from the Netanyahu circles.
Next, N
etanyahu creatively came up with nothing less than the Jewishness of Israel, the ideological cornerstone of Zionism. It was no longer enough that Palestinians recognize Israel as an independent and sovereign state (which by definition can define itself to suit itself). This, the Palestinians had duly done already in 1993 -- but as a precondition for the boon of being allowed to speak with Israel's new PM, they must go further and declare formally that Israel is "A Jewish State" or "The State of the Jewish People."
In effect, this amounted to demanding that Palestinians not only recognize the painful fact that Israel was created at their expense on land which they considered theirs, but also declare this act to have been justified and righteous all along. Which was far too much to swallow even for Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas -- certainly the most accommodating Palestinian leader which Israel encountered, or is likely to encounter at any foreseeable time. Presto, Netanyahu seemed close to the blissful state of having "no partner" and hence no need of any negotiations or concessions.
Some frowns were, however, clearly discernible from beyond the Atlantic -- whereupon Netanyahu moved one step back. He would not make recognition of Israel's Jewishness a precondition for starting negotiations -- but it would still be "a precondition for meaningfully moving forward in such negotiations."
How limited can a state become?
Meanwhile, Netanyahu team's informally let the press know that his rejection of the Two-State Solution was not absolute, Eventually, once admitted to the Oval Office, he might actually accept that idea subject to some limitations -- i.e., that the Palestinian State's territory be no more than half only of the West Bank, that Israel retain complete control over its outer borders and air space, and that a few more restrictions be placed on it in the cause of Israeli security.
The same for the famed Peace Initiative presented by the Arab League in 2002 and renewed in 2007, and which the King of Jordan reintroduced yet again in his meeting with Obama. Netanyahu might embrace some of its constructive elements, for example the idea that the entire Arab World conclude peace agreements with Israel, while quibbling on the territorial price Israel would be asked to pay in exchange.
Abstract adherence to the idea of a Palestinian state, and statements of "not wanting to rule over the Palestinians" are, in fact, not too difficult to make. A bit more demanding test is where they translate at the very least into stopping the construction and extension of settlements on the ground, and removal of the many "outposts" considered illegal even under Israeli occupation law.
Abu Mazen's Palestinian Authority -- smarting with the experience of the last Olmert year, when settlement construction moved fast ahead while negotiations remained stagnant -- has made talking to Netanyahu conditional upon a complete end to all construction in the settlements.
This was backed in the European Union, where the advent of Netanyahu and Lieberman strengthened the hand of those seeking to halt the lucrative upcoming upgrading of the EU's relations with Israel. Also Vice President Biden, when invited to speak at the AIPAC conference, chose precisely that forum to make a very strong and unambiguous statement on the settlement issue.
For his part, in a preliminary meeting with European emissaries Netanyahu sought to turn the issue into one of racial discrimination: "Why should Jews be forbidden to build houses in Judea and Samaria, while Arabs are allowed?" And President Peres, arriving as Netanyahu's emissary to Washington, took up an old ploy: "We can't stop natural growth. Should we forbid the settlers from marrying and having children?"
In fact, already in 2001 George Mitchell -- then acting as Bush's emissary and the author of a comprehensive but disregarded report -- exposed "natural growth in the settlements as a hoax. Under this heading, Palestinian land is continually seized and new settler housing constructed -- some, in truth, for the children of existing settlers, but much for complete newcomers, in some cases directly off the plane from Brooklyn.
Netanyahu's efforts to make his policies seem mild and reasonable encountered the constant obstacle of his Foreign Minister. Also in his new role, Lieberman continued the string of blunt and undiplomatic statements that had gained him the support of more than ten percent of the Israeli electorate. Ever-new Lieberman bon mots got headlines around the world, such as "All concessions got Israel nothing. If you want to peace -- prepare for war!" or "It is no use to talk to Syria -- they are just supporters of terrorism."
The latter would have been quite in tune during the Bush era, but very much at variance with the position of the Obama Administration, seeking a rapprochement with Damascus. When this was pointed out to him, Lieberman was undaunted: "It does not matter, believe me, in the end America will accept our policy decisions."
In token of this, Lieberman administered a small pointed snub to Mitchell. Instead of joining him to the gate, Minister Lieberman let Obama's emissary see himself out of the Foreign Ministry building -- in defiance of a well-established diplomatic protocol.
Was the sensationalist Lieberman's motive, at least partially, no more than an effort to draw attention away from his repeated investigations by the police? The charges of corruption and money laundering, and his relations to some shady East European tycoons and "oligarchs", dating from before the elections, resurfaced immediately in the wake of the polls. So far, the police officers entrusted with investigating the Foreign Minster's questionable past seem undaunted by the fact that their own new boss -- Interior Security Minister Aharonovitch -- is a close confident of Lieberman who owes him the appointment.
According to some commentators, Netanyahu would welcome Lieberman's downfall, upon which he would re-invite Livni to join his cabinet. According to others, the PM is content to let Lieberman go his blunt way, so as to make himself appear "a moderate" in comparison.
'Hitler in Teheran'
Throughout his years in opposition Netanyahu liked to sound the alarm about the grave threat of a "a new Holocaust" resulting from an Iranian achievement of nuclear arms. The Israeli government of the day, whichever that happened to be, was never firm enough about Iran to satisfy him. The fiery demagoguery of Iranian President Ahmedinajad, particularly his repeated belittling of the Holocaust, naturally facilitated the demagoguery of the Likud leader.
As repeatedly reiterated by Netanyahu, construction of the Iranian Bomb could only be stopped by armed action. Preferably, by the United States. Failing that -- by Israel, whose Air Force already for some years took care to obtain long-range planes, capable of reaching all the way to Iran and back. And, diplomacy and a dialogue with the Iranian government would be worse than useless -- no more than an exercise in "appeasement", a la Neville Chamberlain.
Even Bush had never been quite inclined to go in such a direction. Reportedly, on several occasions he emphatically vetoed discreet requests from Olmert to authorize a Israeli strike on Iran. (Aside from other things, even if carried out solely by Israeli forces it would have almost certainly embroiled the US in a major new conflict, on top of its troublesome commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan...)
Obama, for his part, announced already during the US elections his intention of opening a dialogue with Iran. And after coming to power, he and his Secretary of State Clinton were quick to establish a kind of linkage, asserting that a quick achievement of Israeli-Palestinian peace would be vital for building up strong support in the Arab World, strengthening the American hand in dealing with Iran.
Reluctantly, Netanyahu seems to accept the fact that the US is about to embark on a dialogue with Iran -- though clearly hoping against hope that this dialogue would be limited in time and be more in the nature of an ultimatum.
Meanwhile, even as Shimon Peres arrived in Washington in an effort to ease Netanyahu's way, the Americans came up with the call for Israel to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty -- one of several traditional American positions that had effectively gone into abeyance under Bush.
It can be no coincidence that exactly now was made the uncomfortable reminder of that nuclear pile in Dimona which Israeli policy makers would dearly like to keep in the shadows.
Emerging confrontation
Back in 1996, soon after assuming power for the first time, Binyamin Netanyahu had set out for Washington for a first meeting with then President Bill Clinton. At the time, an Israeli cartoon depicted Netanyahu and Clinton as a pair of swimmers busily smiling in each other's faces but kicking each other underwater.
In April, American mediator George Mitchell, when visiting Israel, said before cameras that the US administration sees the two state solution as an American interest, and these words were reiterated by various other members of the new administration.
If there was any sincerity to these words, then a bit of kicking may soon be visible also above water.
